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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the influence of the East Asian crisis and the subsequent reforms 
on the oligopolistic nature of the Thai banking industry. Since the crisis, there have 
been substantial changes in competitive environment, including a decline in the
family ownership of banks as well as the arrival of new entrants. How did these 
changes affect a banking industry in which the six largest local banks accounted for 
over 70 percent of market share? The estimated Lerner index from Bresnahan’s 
[1989] conjectural variation model indicates the possibility of a decline in the degree 
of competition. 
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The Degree of Competition in the Thai Banking Industry 
before and after the East Asian Crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the 1997-98 East Asian crisis and the 
subsequent reforms affected the degree of competition in the Thai banking industry. 
Through the reforms, the industry has undergone substantial changes in terms of the 
ownership of banks and of regulations. In many banks, family ownership has been 
replaced by state and foreign ownership. The banking sector saw several entrants 
during the reforms, a phenomenon that had been absent for more than 20 years before 
the crisis. Despite these developments, a casual observation of loan market share 
suggests that the oligopolistic nature of the industry remains unchanged1. Before as 
well as after the crisis, the six largest banks accounted for 70 percent of total loans of 
the consolidated banking sector. The rather stable market share of the large banks, 
despite the reforms, forms the background of the present analysis on the behavior of 
leading Thai banks. 
To estimate the degree of competition, we apply the method devised by Bresnahan 
                                                  
1 See Vichyanond [1994] for the structure of the Thai banking industry before the East 
Asian crisis. 
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[1989]. Using estimation models based on microeconomic foundations, this method 
allows us to derive the index of the firms’ market power that is calculated as the 
deviation of the market price from the marginal cost. Several studies have applied this 
method to the analysis of the banking industry, and these have often found that the 
banking industries cannot be regarded as being in perfect competition. One of the 
earliest studies is that of Shaffer [1993] on the Canadian banking industry. She used 
time series data for the aggregated banking sector, and estimated an average degree of 
competition over a long period of time2. Bikker and Haaf [2002] applied the same 
method to the banking industries of the European countries. While the estimation based 
on time series data yields only an average degree of competition for a long period, 
panel data from the financial statements of individual banks allows us to estimate the 
industry-wide average degree of competition and to evaluate its year-by-year evolution. 
The latter method has been applied by Angelini and Cetorelli [2003] to the Italian 
banks, and by Uchida and Tsutsui [2005] to the Japanese banks3. Our study, also, 
employs panel data, in our case data relating to the Thai commercial banks during the 
period 1992-2004. By estimating parameters of a market power index for consecutive 
                                                  
2 A similar study is that of Shaffer and DiSalvo [1994], which deals with the time series 
data of two Canadian banks. 
3 Apart from these, Berg and Kim [1994] used the cross-section data of the Norwegian 
banks, and estimated a degree of competition for a particular year. 
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years before and after the crisis, we evaluate the year-by-year evolution of the degree 
of competition. 
The present paper contributes to the empirical literature on the Thai banking 
sector. Among existing studies, in contrast to the abundant literature that outlines the 
financial reform measures that followed the 1997-98 East Asian crisis4, there are 
relatively few quantitative analyses of the structural changes that have occurred in the 
banking industry. Among the few existing studies, Anuchiworawon et al. [2003] and 
Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang [2005] describe the decline of family ownership of 
banks from the perspective of corporate governance. In their study relating to foreign 
bank penetration through the reforms, Okuda and Rungsomboon [2004b] analyze the 
effects of foreign bank entry on the banking industry, and find that an increased 
presence of foreign banks in terms of number of banks is associated with a rise in 
overhead costs, a decline in profits, and an increase in the interest spread of local 
banks.5 In contrast to the narrow focus of Okuda and Rungsomboon [2004b] on the 
effects of foreign bank entries, we consider the effects of the reforms, including 
changes in the ownership structure, on the degree of competition. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe 
                                                  
4 For example, Vichyanond [2000]. 
5 Apart from this, Okuda and Rungsomboon [2004a] estimate cost functions of foreign 
and local commercial banks in Thailand and evaluate changes in cost efficiencies. 
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changes in the Thai banking industry during the crisis and reforms that might affect the 
degree of competition. We present our econometric model in Section 3, and discuss the 
results of estimation in Section 4. In Section 5, we summarize the analysis and offer 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Changes in the competitive environment of the Thai banking industry 
2.1 Structure of the financial sector 
The financial sector in Thailand consists of commercial banks, finance companies and 
government-owned specialized financial institutions. Commercial banks comprise 
banks incorporated in Thailand, and branches of foreign banks. At the end of 2004, 
there were 3,911 branches of locally incorporated banks, while each of 18 foreign 
banks has been allowed to open one branch within Thailand. Finance companies are 
institutions that are not permitted to accept deposits, and raise funds by issuing debt 
instruments instead. Government-owned specialized financial institutions include the 
Government Savings Bank, the Government Housing Bank, and the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives. Apart from the above-listed financial 
institutions, there are savings cooperatives and agricultural cooperatives. The average 
size of these cooperatives and their aggregated share in the financial sector are small. 
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Table 1 summarizes the size of the respective categories of financial institutions. 
 
Table 1, here. 
 
Table 1 shows that the high concentration of market share by the six largest local 
banks remains a salient feature of the Thai financial sector. The total loans of these 
banks account for about a half of the whole financial sector before as well as after the 
East Asian crisis. Before the crisis, their share at one time declined because of a surge 
in the loans of the finance companies. The lending practices of most of these finance 
companies were reportedly bold, and 56 finance companies were closed and liquidated 
in 1997 due to a severe non-performing loans (NPLs) problem. In the subsequent 
financial restructuring period, the share of large commercial banks has been relatively 
low as their loan assets declined sharply as a result of NPLs. As the restructuring 
settled down, their share picked up. This was partially because some leading banks 
merged or succeeded to the viable assets of closed smaller banks and finance 
companies. On balance, the banking industry remained more or less oligopolistic. 
 
2.2 Changes in the competitive environment 
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We can observe two changes in the competitive environment that might have affected 
the degree of competition in the banking industry. First, there were significant changes 
in the ownership structure of financial institutions during the reforms. The government 
not only nationalized and liquidated a number of distressed banks, but also abolished 
the restriction on the foreign ownership of commercial banks in order to invite foreign 
banks and investors to recapitalize the distressed banks. Hitherto, foreign ownership 
had been restricted to less than 25 percent of the equity capital of each financial 
institution, and it was this regulation that was lifted for a specified period. As a result, 
foreign banks now own majority shares in four small and medium banks. As of 1996, 
founding families were the largest shareholders in five of the eight largest banks. By 
2003, foreign investors were the largest shareholders in two banks, including the 
largest one. Two other banks have been either nationalized or liquidated, and there 
remains only one bank in which the largest shareholder is the founding family (Polsiri 
and Wiwattanakantang 2005). 
 
Table 2, here. 
 
Second, there has also been a significant change in the attitudes of the financial 
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authorities towards entry to the banking sector. There had been no new entry and only 
one exit between 1980 and 1996, whereas five banks exited through liquidations and 
mergers during the recent reforms, and two state owned banks were established to 
succeed to part of the assets and liabilities of the closed banks. Furthermore, a private 
finance company was upgraded to commercial bank status in 2004 by the issuance of a 
brand-new banking license, the first such initiative in the last two decades. 
Such changes in ownership structure as well as entry and exit in the industry may 
affect the degree of competition. In practical terms, these changes may make it difficult 
to maintain collusion, if any, between banks, and this in turn might well lead to an 
intensification of competition within the industry. 
 
2.3 Changes in the performance of banks 
In order to analyze the degree of competition among banks, we have to take into 
account changes in their performance as well as in the structure of their revenues and 
expenses. First, there has been a notable fluctuation in the profitability of the banks. In 
Figure 1, we present a summary of selected indices concerning the performance of the 
banking industry using data compiled from the income statements of the consolidated 
commercial banks in Thailand (excluding branches of foreign banks). One of the 
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reasons for the fluctuation in profitability is the problem of non performing loans 
(NPLs). The ratio of NPLs to total loans rose to around 45 percent in 1999. The NPLs 
problem lowered profitability in two ways. First, the banks incurred huge expenses in 
the form of loan loss provisions for the disposal of NPLs (depicted as the dotted line in 
Figure 1). Moreover, NPLs, either classified or non-classified, reduced interest income 
from these assets, thus bringing about an abrupt decline in net interest income in 1998 
(depicted as the fine continuous line in Figure 1). It was not until 2001 that the net 
profits of the banks became positive again. 
 
Figure 1, here. 
 
Changes in interest rates have also been remarkable. Figure 2 illustrates lending 
and deposit interest rates and the interest margin between two rates. While both the 
lending and deposit interest rates fell considerably in the reform process, the spread 
widened to more than four percent in the 2000s from around three percent before the 
crisis. This widening margin partially accounts for the rising net interest income in 
recent years (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 2, here. 
 
Changes are also apparent in both revenue and cost structures. Figure 3 portrays 
the structure of revenues and expenses as a percentage of total assets for the 
consolidated commercial banks (excluding branches of foreign banks). So far as the 
changes in the structure of revenues are concerned, we can see a sharp drop in 
‘interests on loans and deposits’6 in 1999, which corresponds to the decline in the 
lending interest rate (see also Figure 2). Another significant change is the increase in 
‘other interests and dividends revenue’ after 1998. In particular, there was an increase 
in the interest revenue from government bonds. As a restructuring scheme, the 
government injected capital into some distressed banks, and these banks received 
government bonds. As a result, the portfolio pattern of these banks was modified, 
leading to an increase in the interest revenue from government bonds. 
As regards changes in the structure of expenses, the effect of the declining deposit 
interest rate is reflected in a drop in interest expenses. In addition, a decline in 
personnel expenses is apparent. Another important change is the rise in the 
‘contribution to the Financial Institution Development Fund (FIDF)’. The FIDF is an 
                                                  
6 Deposits here refer to banks’ deposits at other financial institutions. 
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institution affiliated to the Bank of Thailand (the central bank), and it has been 
providing an implicit blanket guarantee for depositors of financial institutions. The 
contribution of banks to FIDF can be regarded as a premium for deposit insurance. The 
rate was raised in late 1997 from 0.1 percent of total deposit per annum to 0.4 percent, 
causing a marked increase in expenses relating to this item. 
 
Figure 3, here. 
 
3. Analytical Framework and Data 
3.1 Analytical framework 
As our analytical framework, we adopt Bresnahan’s [1989] conjectural variation model 
of competition. Specifically, we consider a loan market in which banks face a demand 
function , with ),( zQpp ≡ ∑= i iqQ  i= 1, 2, …, n, where p  is the lending interest 
rate,  is the individual banks’ loan supply, and  is the vector of exogenous 
factors affecting the demand for loans. In the existing empirical literature on the 
banking industry, there has been a controversy over whether deposits should be treated 
as an input or output. In line with most of the empirical studies of the degree of 
competition, we treat both labor and deposits as factor inputs, and loans as banks’ sole 
iq z
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output. Thus, Bank i’s maximization problem is 
),(),(max iiii qCqzQp ωπ −⋅= ,     (1) 
where ),( iiqC ω  is Bank i’s cost function, with iω  being the vector of the prices of 
its factor inputs.  
The first order condition is 
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where  is the marginal cost, and iMC QpQ /)/( ∂−∂≡η  is the semi-elasticity of loan 
demand to the lending interest rate. )/()( iii qQqQ ∂∂≡θ  is Bank i’s conjectural 
elasticity of total loan of the banking industry with respect to its own loans, that is, 
Bank i’s expectation on how other banks react to its output change. This term indicates 
the bank’s market power – i.e. the extent to which the bank can manipulate the loan 
supply and the lending interest rate by collusion with other banks. When the market is 
in perfect competition, iθ  takes the value of zero for all banks. In a monopoly, iθ  
equals one. 
There are two ways of estimating the degree of competition using Equation (3). 
One method is to obtain iθ  by identifying it separately from the semi-elasticity of 
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demand, η . However, insofar as we assume a homogeneous loan market, we have 
only one observation per year for the aggregate loan demand7. Thus, we cannot obtain 
annual estimates of η , but an estimate of average semi-elasticity over a long period of 
time, so that we cannot retrieve annual estimates of iθ . The second method is to 
estimate ηθ /i  as one parameter (Angelini and Cetorelli [2003]). In the latter case, 
dividing both sides of Equation (3) by p , we obtain a Lerner index,  
pp
MCpL iii
ηθ /=−≡ .      (4) 
This Lerner index, , measures the mark-up of price over marginal cost, 
indicating the market power of a bank. We estimate a cross-sectional average of 
]1,0[∈L
ηθ /i  
for each year and derive an industry-wide average Lerner index to see how it has 
evolved before and after the crisis. 
Rearranging Equation (3) yields 
iiii qMCqR ⋅+⋅= η
θ ,      (3’) 
where  refers to Bank i’s interest incomeiR
8. To calculate the marginal cost, we 
consider the following translog cost function; 
                                                  
7 Uchida and Tsutsui [2005] estimate the demand equation for each year with the 
assumption that each bank faces heterogeneous loan demand, which is contradictory to 
the formulation of the supply equation with loans of banks as a homogeneous product. 
8 If we estimate Equation (3) without this rearrangement, the dependent variable is 
the lending interest rate. Discrepancies in the lending rates among banks contradict 
the formulation of the demand function that assumes loans of all banks are a 
homogeneous product. By multiplying both sides of the equation with the quantity of 
loans, we can transform the lending interest rate in the left hand side to the interest 
income. This allows us to avoid this theoretical contradiction. 
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where i,1lnω  and i,2lnω  stand for the deposit interest rate and wage, respectively. 
Differentiating (5) with respect to  yields the following marginal cost as below:  iq
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Substituting it into (3’) completes the supply equation. 
As an empirical strategy, we estimate the bank’s supply function (3’) 
simultaneously with the cost function (5) on the assumption that estimating the supply 
function simultaneously with the cost function will improve the precision of estimation. 
We basically follow Angelini and Cetorelli [2003] in the formulation of the estimation 
equations. One difference is that we add a control variable,  in the cost 
equation, with  referring to the amount of NPLs. Since the sample span includes 
the period of the crisis, including notably the abrupt rise in non-performing loans 
(NPLs) and the associated decline in the net amount of loans, this term is expected to 
control such shocks. Thus, the formulation of the estimation equations is as follows; 
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In Equation (8), ( )mηθ  (m= 1993, 1994, …, 2004) stands for the degree of 
competition for each year, from which we construct the Lerner index. 
 
3.2 Data 
Our data set covers the six largest commercial banks for the period 1992-2004.9 We 
select these banks according to the following criteria: (i) banks which existed 
throughout the period of analysis; (ii) banks that maintained more than three percent of 
the bank loan market share throughout the period of analysis, and (iii) banks which 
were not majority-owned by foreign investors. With regard to the first criterion, those 
banks which were liquidated or merged with other banks have been eliminated from 
the data set since the cost structure of these banks may differ from others due to their 
bad lending practice. The third criterion is based on the questionnaire survey of Okuda 
[2004] which showed that the target customers of the foreign-owned banks differ from 
those of other locally incorporated banks, and that there is possible market 
segmentation. 
The data we employ have been derived from the annual reports of individual 
banks, Statistical Data on Commercial Banks in Thailand, published annually by 
                                                  
9 These are Bangkok Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Kasikornbank (formerly Thai Farmers 
Bank), The Siam Commercial Bank, TMB Bank (formerly Thai Military Bank), and 
Bank of Ayudhaya. 
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Bangkok Bank, and Thailand’s Commercial Banks, Nov. 25, 1997 by Thai Investment 
and Securities Public Company Limited.  
We provide the definition of variables and their descriptive statistics in Table 3. 
With regard to output, we use ‘net earning assets’, which comprise loans as well as 
investments. As we have seen in the last section, after the crisis, banks shifted their 
portfolios towards securities. Using ‘net loans’ as the volume of output leads to an 
underrating of banking operations in recent years. Second, interest rates are ex post 
values, that is, interest incomes (expenses) divided by net earning assets (total 
liabilities). Therefore, the lending interest rate gets lower than the nominal ex ante 
lending rate when the ‘net earning assets’ comprises unclassified NPLs, this being 
particularly the case in 1998-99. Third, we define the costs and the deposit interest rate 
in two ways. In the basic definition of the costs ( ), we count only the interest 
expenditure and personnel expenses because these items are two main variable 
components of ordinary expenditure. In the alternative definition, given the marked 
increase in ‘contribution to FIDF’ in recent years, we include this expenditure item in 
the costs, ( ). Accordingly, the deposit interest rate, 
iC
iC2 iR ,2ω , is calculated by dividing 
the sum of the interest costs and the contribution to FIDF with total liabilities. 
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Table 3, here. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Results 
We estimate Equations (7) and (8) simultaneously by three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
regressions, using the pooled data of the six largest commercial banks for 1993-200410. 
As for instrumental variables, in addition to the exogenous factor prices and the 
amount of NPLs, we employ the lagged variables of the terms that include  and 
. 
iq
iC
We first estimate Equation (7) and (8). The estimated parameters of the cost 
function do not fulfill the condition of monotonicity (not reported). Considering the 
small sample size, we might need a more parsimonious specification of the cost 
equation. In fact, we test the null hypothesis that the cost equation takes the form based 
on the Cobb-Douglas production function, and cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Accordingly, we estimate the system with the restrictive specification of the cost 
function as below11. 
                                                  
10 The data set covers the period 1992-2004. As we use some lagged variables for 
instruments, the sample is shortened to 1993-2004. 
11 The wrong signs of the parameters of the translog cost equation are also observable 
in previous studies including Angelini and Cetorelli [2003] and Uchida and Tutsui 
[2005]. Instead of a problematical cost equation, we opt for a cost function, albeit 
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ikkiiWiRii banknplqC εδρωγωγββ +⋅+++++= ∑)ln(lnlnlnln ,2,110  (7’) 
( ) ii
m
mii qCR νηθβ +⋅+= ∑1         (8’) 
Also, we include intercept dummies for individual banks,  (k=2, 3, 4, 5, 6), to 
account for possible differences in cost efficiencies. 
kbank
Table 4 reports the results of estimation. In general, the fit of the cost function is 
satisfactory. All the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. 1<1β  suggests 
economies of scale in the banking industry. With regard to the differences in cost 
efficiencies among banks, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of no differences. We 
also perform a Hausman specification test, which also is in favor of the model that 
includes the bank dummies. On the other hand, whether or not the contribution to FIDF 
is included in the costs does not much affect the results of the estimation. Thus, we put 
forward the analysis based on the estimation result of model (3) in Table 4. 
 
Table 4, here. 
 
To construct the Lerner index, we divide ( )mηθ  for each year by an average of 
the ex post lending interest rates of six banks for the corresponding period. We depict 
                                                                                                                                                  
restrictive, with appropriate properties. 
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the derived index in Figure 4. As can be seen, the Lerner index swung down 
considerably in 1998-1999. However, we do not consider this is due to intensified 
competition among banks. On the contrary, the low score of the Lerner index is related 
to non-filed NPLs in the earning assets. As the loan classification was still loose in the 
late 1990s, banks had a considerable amount of non-filed NPLs on their balance sheets. 
Non-filed NPLs lowered the ex post lending interest rate, which resulted in the low 
score of the Lerner index. On the other hand, a more interesting finding from Figure 4 
is the rise in the Lerner index in the post-crisis period. How can we interpret this 
change? We devote the rest of the analysis to discussion of this question. 
 
Figure 4, here. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
The rise in the Lerner index in recent years implies that, despite changes in the 
competitive environment of the banking industry in terms of ownership structures and 
regulations, competition in the industry might have declined during the 2000s. In this 
regard, we cannot perform a statistical analysis to regress the derived Lerner index on 
some relevant state variables because of the shortness of the sample period. Instead, we 
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list some points that might be related to the rise in the Lerner index. 
One factor that might account for the rising trend of the Lerner index is the 
business cycle. In the conditions of slowdown that have been evident in the economy 
since the financial crisis, both lending and deposit interest rates have declined 
markedly in recent years. Moreover, the moderate decline of the lending interest rate in 
relation to the deposit interest rate, and the widening interest margin might be 
indicative of a decline in the creditworthiness of borrowers. However, a quantitative 
evaluation of these changes is beyond the scope of this present paper. 
Second, we look at loan demand elasticity. The Lerner index is composed of the 
semi-elasticity of loan demand to the lending interest rate, and the conjectural elasticity. 
Thus, the increase in the Lerner index in recent years might be due to the decline in the 
semi-elasticity of loan demand. Temporarily suspending the assumption that the loans 
of all banks are homogeneous products, we estimate, as a tentative exercise, the 
following loan demand function with fixed effects regression. 
 )(lnlnln ,,1210, tiit titttti pYYq ευηααα ++⋅+⋅+⋅+= ∑− ,  (9) 
tiq ,  in this estimation refers to the loans of Bank i, net of allowance for doubtful 
accounts.  and  stand for the ex post lending interest rate for Bank i and the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), respectively. 
tip , tY
tη  is the industry-wide average 
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semi-elasticity of loan demand. We summarize the result of estimation in Table 5. We 
have to note that this is possibly a biased estimation because of missing explanatory 
variables. Taking this into account, we compute the conjectural elasticity, θ , and 
depict it in Figure 5. In this figure, though tentative, we can confirm the trend of rising 
θ . Thus, the results from the preliminary estimation of demand function do not deny 
the possibility of a decline in the banking competition since the financial crisis. 
 
Table 5, here. 
Figure 5, here. 
If the degree of competition really is declining, what are the possible reasons for 
such a behavioral change among the banks? One possible explanation is that the banks 
need to increase net interest income to make up for the losses from the disposal of 
NPLs. As can be seen in Figure 1 in Section 2, despite the rising net interest income, 
the return on assets still remains much lower than the pre-crisis level. Such a condition 
might be related to a possible decline in banking competition. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this article, we have estimated the degree of competition in the Thai banking 
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industry in order to evaluate how the 1997-98 East Asian crisis and the subsequent 
reforms affected the structure of the banking industry. In particular, applying the 
method of Bresnahan’s [1989] conjectural variation model, we have derived a Lerner 
index which measures the mark-up of price over marginal cost. 
In spite of changes in the competitive environment of the banking industry in 
terms of ownership structures and regulations, the Lerner index showed a rising trend 
in the post-crisis period. During the post-crisis reforms, family ownerships in a number 
of banks were replaced with state and foreign ownerships. There were also new 
entrants to the industry, a phenomenon that had been absent for a long period. These 
changes may make it difficult to maintain collusion, if any, between banks. However, 
preliminary estimation results reveal the possibility of a decline in competition.  
The present analysis is limited in the sense that we cannot perform statistical 
analysis on the causes of a change in the degree of competition due to the shortness of 
the sample period. Nonetheless, it is hoped that this paper can be regarded as a useful 
contribution to the empirical literature on the Thai banking sector until such time as an 
accumulation of quantitative studies makes it possible to undertake more in-depth 
policy analyses. 
There remain several outstanding issues arising from our analysis. First, the 
 21 
sample period is short, which not only affect the robustness of estimations, but also 
makes it difficult to judge the effects of the financial reforms on the degree of 
competition as the effect may have not yet have fully worked its way through. Second, 
the assumption of the quantity competition among banks in a static framework may be 
restrictive, especially for the crisis and reform period. We leave the resolution of these 
problems as a task for future research. 
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Table 1: Credit Extended by Financial Institutions (FIs) and Number of FIs 
Credit extended by Financial Institutions millions of baht share(%) millions of baht share(%) millions of baht share(%) millions of baht share(%)
Commercial banks 2,161,945          74.4       4,825,057          69.8        4,585,931           76.9       5,081,346            77.0        
  of which 6 largest locally incorporated banks 1,659,760 57.1 3,086,243 44.7 2,597,864 43.6 3,607,270 54.7       
 of which foreign bank branches 111,639 3.8         376,992 5.5         467,387 7.8         454,164 6.9         
Finance companies 547,710             18.8       1,488,188          21.5        449,856              7.5         281,129               4.3          
Credit-foncier (mortgage loan) companies 5,123                 0.2         6,742                 0.1          3,327                  0.1         1,080                   0.0          
Life insurance companies 21,206               0.7         30,204               0.4          39,931                0.7         45,014                 0.7          
Government-owned financial institutions 170,275             5.9         561,760             8.1          883,118              14.8       1,189,575            18.0        
Total 2,906,259        100.0   6,911,951        100.0      5,962,163         100.0   6,598,144          100.0    
Number of Financial Institutions
Commercial banks
   local banks 15 15 13 12
   foreign banks 14                      14                      21                       18                        
Finance companies 92 91 21 18
Credit-foncier (mortgage loan) companies 18 12 10 5
Government-owned financial institutions 5 6 6 5
Source: Economic and Financial Statistics (various issues), Bank of Thailand
     Statistical Data on Commercial Banks in Thailand (various issues), Bangkok Bank
1992 1996 2000 2004
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Table 2: Reorganization of the Thai Banking Industry 
Bangkok Bank            Bangkok Bank 
 
 
Thai Farmers Bank            Kasikornbank (Thai Farmers Bank) 
 
 
Siam Commercial Bank          Siam Commercial Bank 
 
 
Bank of Ayudhaya            Bank of Ayudhaya 
 
 
Thai Military Bank            TMB Bank (Thai Military Bank) 
 
     new banking license granted to a finance company in 2001  Thanachart Bank 
 
 
Krung Thai Bank (state owned bank)         Krung Thai Bank 
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Source: Compiled from data in Table 2:2 of Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang [2005] 
nationalized in 1998 
Siam City Bank           Siam City Bank 
 
    nationalized in 1998 and integrated with Siam City Bank in 2002 
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank 
    
First Bangkok City Bank  nationalized and closed in 1998 loans/ liabilities transferred to Krung Thai Bank     
    
 
Bangkok Bank of Commerce   nationalized in 1996 and closed in 1998 loans/ liabilities transferred to Krung Thai Bank 
    
nationalized in 1998, integrated with a finance company, 
   transformed into a new bank in 1998 BankThai 
Union Bank of Bangkok     BankThai     BankThai 
        
   nationalized in 1999, acquired by ABN AMRO Bank in 1999 
Bank of Asia           Bank of Asia 
   acquired by Development Bank of Singapore in1998, merged with TMB Bank 
Thai Danu Bank           
 
acquired by Standard Chartered Bank 
Nokornthon Bank                  Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank 
 
   nationalized and newly established as Radanasin Bank in1997, acquired by United Overseas Bank in1998 
Laem Thong Bank                  UOB Radanasin Bank 
 
State ow
ned banks 
Foreign ow
ned banks 
Table 3: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3. (A) Definition 
Variable  definition 
  Total earning assets, net of allowance for doubtful accounts iq
  Interest income/ Total earning assets ip
  Interest income iR
  Non performing loans inpl
  The sum of interest expenses and personnel expenses iC
  The sum of interest expenses, personnel expenses, and contribution to  iC2
    FIDF 
 iR,ω  Interest expenses/ Total liabilities 
 iR ,2ω  [Interest expenses+ contribution to FIDF]/ Total liabilities 
 iw,ω  Personnel expenses/ Number of employees 
Source: Author 
Note: FIDF = Financial Institution Development Fund (see text for explanation) 
 
Table 3. (B) Descriptive statistics 
q p R npl C C(2) ω(R) ω(R2) ω(W) 
mil. baht percent mil. baht mil. baht mil. baht mil. baht percent percent baht
Average 539,996     8.88 45,488       79,780       34,379       36,001       5.23 5.46 357,115     
Maximum 1,129,362  14.51 133,010     533,106     113,447     117,739     11.47 11.85 682,427     
Minimum 136,088     3.03 14,754       1,297         8,913         10,395       0.89 1.25 184,471     
Standard Deviation 251,935     3.30 25,315       108,807     21,170       21,431       2.60 2.53 107,997      
Source: Author’s calculation   
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Table 4: Results of estimation (cost and supply equations) 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
β0 2.0929 0.000 -0.7133 0.334 2.5163 0.004 -0.6825 0.258
β1 0.8176 0.000 0.9324 0.000 0.8105 0.000 0.9428 0.000
γ1 0.8308 0.000 0.1555 0.000 0.8502 0.000 0.8665 0.000
γ2 0.1692 0.000 0.8445 0.000 0.1498 0.000 0.1335 0.000
δ 0.0226 0.033 0.0158 0.110 0.0258 0.000 0.0170 0.034
bk2 -0.0769 0.008 -0.0801 0.002
bk3 -0.1232 0.000 -0.1319 0.000
bk4 -0.1515 0.000 -0.1611 0.000
bk5 -0.1906 0.000 -0.2006 0.000
bk6 -0.0540 0.021 -0.0579 0.005
(θ/η)93 0.0047 0.000 0.0379 0.000 0.0478 0.000 0.0370 0.000
(θ/η)94 0.0467 0.000 0.0388 0.000 0.0472 0.000 0.0380 0.000
(θ/η)95 0.0481 0.000 0.0382 0.000 0.0484 0.000 0.0370 0.000
(θ/η)96 0.0483 0.000 0.0383 0.000 0.0488 0.000 0.0373 0.000
(θ/η)97 0.0476 0.000 0.0372 0.000 0.0482 0.000 0.0361 0.000
(θ/η)98 0.0273 0.000 0.0146 0.000 0.0280 0.000 0.0132 0.000
(θ/η)99 0.0147 0.000 0.0063 0.023 0.0153 0.000 0.0058 0.018
(θ/η)00 0.0230 0.000 0.0169 0.000 0.0233 0.000 0.0163 0.000
(θ/η)01 0.0239 0.000 0.0189 0.000 0.0242 0.000 0.0184 0.000
(θ/η)02 0.0232 0.000 0.0190 0.000 0.0232 0.000 0.0187 0.000
(θ/η)03 0.0231 0.000 0.0199 0.000 0.0232 0.000 0.0198 0.000
(θ/η)04 0.0258 0.000 0.0235 0.000 0.0263 0.000 0.0234 0.000
No. of observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared
 Cost equation 0.9922 0.9890 0.9934 0.9899
 Supply equation 0.9981 0.9981 0.9981 0.9981
Wald test 19.28 0.002 27.81 0.000
Hausman test 19.30 0.000 26.64 0.000
with bank dummies without bank dummies with bank dummies wothout bank dummies
without FIDF contribution without FIDF contribution with FIDF contribution with FIDF contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: The system of equation estimated is  
iiiwirii nplqC εδωβωβββ +++++= )ln(lnlnlnln ,3,210  
( ) ii
m
mii qCR νηθβ +⋅+= ∑1     
Following variables are used as instrumental variables. (1) Exogenous variables: ir ,lnω , iw,lnω , 
 and dummy variables for each year. (2) Lagged variables of endogenous variables: , 
, and . 
)ln( inpl iqln
iC iq
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Table 5: Results of estimation (demand equation) 
coefficient p-value
α0 10.1064 0.437
α1 2.7843 0.352
α2 -0.7821 0.845
η93 -3.6498 0.650
η94 -4.8330 0.548
η95 -5.1097 0.352
η96 -5.2843 0.099
η97 -4.0918 0.004
η98 -3.7849 0.023
η99 -8.0929 0.001
η00 -12.0817 0.000
η01 -15.2108 0.000
η02 -19.0561 0.000
η03 -24.4087 0.000
η04 -27.5423 0.006
No. of observations 72
R-squared
  within 0.8219
  between 0.1479
  overall 0.1595  
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Figure 1: Selected indices of performance of commercial banks, 1989-2004 
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Source: Statistical Data on Commercial Banks in Thailand, various issues. 
Note: ROA = return on assets 
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Figure 2: Interest rates and interest margin, 1989-2004 
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
18.00
19
89
M
1
19
89
M
9
19
90
M
5
19
91
M
1
19
91
M
9
19
92
M
5
19
93
M
1
19
93
M
9
19
94
M
5
19
95
M
1
19
95
M
9
19
96
M
5
19
97
M
1
19
97
M
9
19
98
M
5
19
99
M
1
19
99
M
9
20
00
M
5
20
01
M
1
20
01
M
9
20
02
M
5
20
03
M
1
20
03
M
9
20
04
M
5
Lending Rate
Deposit Rate
Interest margin
 
Source: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, International Monetary Fund. 
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Figure 3: Structure of expenses of commercial banks, 1989-2004 
(A) Interest and non-interest income 
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(B) Interest expenses and provision for possible loan losses 
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1989
1991
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year
percentage of total assets
Interest expenses
Provision for possible loan losses
 
(C) Non-interest expenses 
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
year
 percentage of total assets
Personnel expenses
Other operating expenses
Contribution to FIDF
Loss on sales of investment and securities
Other expenses
 
Source: Statistical Data on Commercial Banks in Thailand, various issues. 
Note: ‘Other operating expenses consist of ‘premises and equipment’, ‘taxes and duties’, and 
‘directors’ remuneration’. Until 1997, ‘Contribution to FIDF’ and ‘Loss on sales of investment and 
securities’ are counted in ‘Other expenses’.
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 Figure 4: Lerner index 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: The Lerner index is calculated using the following formula: mmm pL /)/( ηθ= , m=1993, 1994, 
…, 2004. m)/( ηθ  is obtained from the estimation result (4) in Table 4. mp  is an average of the ex 
post lending interest rates of the six banks for the corresponding year. 
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Figure 5: Conjectural elasticity of loan supply 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
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